In a production economy where a single private good is produced via a non-linear concave technology, no direct mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness and efficiency if the preference domain contains the class of linear preferences. D
Introduction
The trade-off between efficiency and strategy-proofness has been studied in great detail in the case of the distribution and exchange of private goods. These concepts together lead to decidedly unfair allocations of resources. Originating from a conjecture in Hurwicz (1972) , this result was first proved in the two-agent case (e.g. Kato and Ohseto, 2002; Ju, 2003; Schummer, 1997; Sprumont, 1995; Zhou, 1991) examining various domain restrictions. Recently, Serizawa (2002) formally established this negative result for an arbitrary number of agents.
We study the same trade-off for simple production economies where a single private good is produced via a concave technology. Maniquet and Sprumont (1999) show that strategy-proofness and efficiency can coexist in a linear production model on the domain of classical economic preferences, even in combination with anonymity. They call the resulting unique solution the equal budget free choice mechanism: every agent obtains the bundle she would choose if operating the technology alone.
We show that this positive result does not survive if the single technology is concave but not linear (though not necessarily strictly concave). Then strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible on the domain of linear preferences. Because strategy-proofness is a stronger property on larger domains, our result extends to any domain containing the class of linear preferences. Shenker (1992) considers a cost-sharing model that includes ours as a special case. He states that if the technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale, any incentive compatible sharing rule is of the serial type. This would imply our result as serial-like methods are not first-best efficient. Yet, our result improves upon his statement on the strategy-proofness and efficiency trade-off in three respects. First of all, Shenker imposes smoothness conditions on the technology and on the allocation rule, which we do not. Secondly, his additional conditions on the technology amount in our setting to strict concavity of the production function, which we do not require. Lastly, and more importantly, his incentive compatibility criterion is much stronger than strategy-proofness: implementability in Nash equilibrium strategies is in fact even stronger than group strategy-proofness.
The model and theorem
Let N={1, . . ., n} be the set of agents. Let F be a strictly increasing, concave (though not necessarily strictly concave) non-linear function of R + to itself such that F(0) = 0. A bundle is an element z i = (x i , y i )aR + Â R, and an allocation is a list of n bundles, z = (z 1 , . . ., z n ), one for each agent. The set of feasible allocations is denoted by
For any subset SpN, we write x s ¼ P ias x i and y s ¼ P ias y i : Each agent is endowed with a preference, R i , over R þ Â R which is strictly monotonic: strictly increasing in y i and strictly decreasing in x i . We denote by R 0 the class of preferences. A preference profile is a list of n preferences, R = (R 1 , . . ., R n ). We sometimes write R = (R j , R À j ) for some jaN. Let LoR 0 be the class of linear preferences. Each preference LaL can be identified with a number laR þþ that corresponds to the slope of its indifference curves in the (x, y)-plane. The corresponding utility for agent i is u i (x i , y i ) = y i À lx i .
For any subset ApR þ Â R and any preference relation R i aR, we define mðA; R i Þ ¼ fz i aAAbz V i aA z i R i zV i g to be the set of maximal elements of A according to R i . For any preference profile RaR N , we denote by PEðRÞufz a ZjbzV a Z½zV i R i z i bi a N Zz V i I i z i biaN the set of Pareto-efficient allocations.
Let RpR 0 , a direct allocation mechanism (or mechanism) l : R N ! Z associates with each preference profile a feasible allocation. We are interested in the following axioms to be verified by a mechanism l:
Pareto efficiency (PE) bRaR N ; lðRÞaPEðRÞ:
Theorem. Let LpRpR 0 . No mechanism l:R N ! Z satisfies SP and PE.
As in Maniquet and Sprumont (1999) we determine the shape of the agents option sets, i.e. the sets of attainable bundles given the reports of others. We proceed by contradiction, assuming that a mechanism l satisfies SP and PE to later show that the shapes of the option sets generated by l are not feasible; namely, budget balance is violated.
We start the proof with two lemmas. Lemma 1 states a general property of option sets and can be found in Maniquet and Sprumont (1999) . Loosely speaking, Lemma 2 states that if a function f is concave and if a function g has the same slope as f for every value of t in its domain, then g coincides with f up to a positive constant. First, a definition: a strictly increasing subset of R þ Â R is a set ho R þ Â R such that for all ðx i ; y i Þ; ðxV i ; yV i Þah; x i > xV i Zy i > yV i . 
(with the convention that arg max taR + ( f(t) À lt)={ + l} p t if l < lim t ! l f V(t)), there exists aaR such that g and f + a coincide on D \ ½x m ; þl.
Proof. Define, for any la]0, l m [,
f ðtÞ À lt and hðlÞ ¼ max taD gðtÞ À lt Letting x(l ) be a solution of max t z 0 f (t ) À lt, writing w(l) = f (x(l )) À lx(l ) yields that the derivative of w at l equals wV(l) = xV(l )( f V(x(l)) À l) À x(l) with either f V(x (l )) = l (in general) or x V(l) = 0 (at a kink in the graph of f ). I.e., wV(l) = À x for some x a arg max t z 0 f (t ) À lt. From the concavity of f, arg max t z 0 f (t) À lt is single-valued everywhere except on a countable subset of values of l, corresponding to the linear parts of f (if any). Similarly, the derivative of h at l equals hV(l ) = À x for some xaarg max t a D g(t) À lt for any la]0, l m [. n
We now tackle the proof of the theorem. For the sake of contradiction let l:L N ! Z satisfy SP and PE. For any LaL N denote the corresponding vector of slopes (l 1 , . . ., l n ) and write l(L) = (x i , y i ) iaN . Define l = min jaN l j and J = arg min jaN l j . Denote by F V(resp. F V_) the derivative (resp. left-derivative) of F. Because F is non-linear, we can assume
Step 1
x N ¼ x J a arg maxðFðtÞ À ltÞ ðbÞ and;
Condition (a) follows from trade efficiency: any agent i for which l i > l and x i > 0 would gladly pay 
Steps 2-4 are devoted to the description of the shape of O i (L À i ).
Step 2
for some a i aR:
. Also, for any l i < l i À , x i ðl i Þzx i ; and if there exists some l i V < l i À for which x i ðl i VÞ ¼x i , the same reasoning as above yields
Step 2 has been proved. For the next step, we use the following notation: for any kaR, define B(k) ={(x i , y i )aR + Â Rjy i = F(x i ) + k}.
Step 3
Let x be the real-valued function whose graph is O i (L À i ) and D its domain. We wish to apply Lemma 2 where F plays the role of f, x the role of g and where l m = l i À . We need to check that for any 0 < l i < l i À ,
FðtÞ À l i t:
; therefore, by the definition of x, x i aarg max taD x(t) À l i t. However, J={i} because l i < l i À ; condition (3.b) yields x i aarg max t z 0 F(t)-l i t. We can apply Lemma 2 and conclude that x and F coincide up to a constant on ½x i ; þl½.
Step 4
By concavity of F and by definition ofx i , F is strictly concave atx i . Therefore, lim lzl À i (arg max ( F(t) lt)) =x i , and hence lim lzl À i x i ðlÞ ¼x i . Steps 2 and 3 yield the result. Now that the shape of O i (L À i ) has been determined, we show that it is an implausible one. Note that a i is actually a function of L -i ; from now on we write a i (L -i ). For any LaL N let l n À 1 * denote the second smallest entry of the corresponding vector of slopes (l 1 , . . ., l n )aR + + n . Also, for any laR + + , define h(l) = max( F(t)-lt).
Step 5
For any
Consider LaL N and the corresponding (l 1 , . . ., l n )aR + N . Recall that J = arg min jaN l j ; clearly J p t.
Step 1 requires x i = 0 and y i = a i (L À i ) for all igJ. If jJj = 1, say J={ j}, then y i = a j (L À j ) + l n À 1 *x j + F(x j ) À F(x j ). By efficiency: Upon noticing that h is strictly decreasing on l; FVð0Þ½, a slight variation of a standard argument in the literature on Clarke-Grove mechanisms (omitted for brevity but available upon request) yields a contradiction: (l 1 , . . ., l n )ih(l n À 1 * ) cannot be decomposed into n functions depending only on n À 1 variables.
Remark. We strongly suspect that our proof technique successfully applies to the many-inputs-oneoutput case without many conceptual modifications.
